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l. The idea to make a machine play chess is a rather old one. Serious 
efforts to realize this idea, however, had to wait until the development 
of the electronic computer. In 1950, Claude Shannon published an article 
(SHANNON 1950) in which, for the first time, the problem was realistically 
posed and workable suggestions were made for the development of a 
chess program. In the present article I shall first summarize Shannon's 
ideas, next to discuss in general terms which types of heuristics have been 
proposed and used to improve the playing strength of a chess program. 
Finally, the question will be raised in how far, or in what sense, chess 
programs can be considered to simulate human thinking and,thereby, 
to contribute to our understanding of human thought processes. 
2. In his 1950 article, Shannon first demonstrates that it is theoretically 
possible but far beyond the power of any conceivable electronic brain 
to make it play a "perfect game". The number of possible variations is 
far too large to be examined up to their legal ending in definitely won, 
drawn or lost positions. Therefore, the tree of possible moves and con-
tinuations must be cut down, in depth, by some stop rule. 
This makes for the indispensability of an approximate evaluation function 
by means of which, in each variation, the value of the end position can 
be estimated. Shannon proposes a numerical scale that runs from "com-
pletely won" over various degrees of "favorable", to "equal", unfavorable" 
and "completely lost". 
The outcomes of the variations, that is, the values of the evaluation 
function in the corresponding end positions, can then be used to decide 
on the move by means of a decision procedure of the minimax type. The 
principle is that the effective value or derived outcome of a position 
within the tree equals the maximal outcome in the set of positions after 
one more move, in case the machine is to play, while it equals the minimal 
outcome if its opponent is to play. By working backward from the end 
positions of the variations to the given position the move with the maximal 
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derived outcome can be selected. With a perfect evaluation function-
that would provide the true value of any position-this move would be 
objectively the best one, in fact. But then, there would be no need to 
calculate more than one move deep! The trouble is, of course, that a 
perfect evaluation function is impossible. The idea of calculating a few 
moves deep is to reduce the influence of its errors. 
Now Shannon calls a type A strategy a program based on: (1) a stop 
rule that simply specifies the number of moves to be calculated, in depth; 
(2) an approximate evaluation function and (3) a minimax-like decision 
procedure. 
He realizes, however, that such a strategy would be very inefficient 
and wasteful. First, any static evaluation function is sure to fail badly 
whenever the end position happens to be a situation where tactical 
complications are going on: captures, checks, threats, mating attacks, etc. 
Obviously the stop rule is too crude: the program should make allowances 
to "examine forceful variations out as far as possible and (to) evaluate 
only at reasonable positions, where some quasi-stability has been 
established". Second, if every legal move and, again, every legal con-
tinuation must be examined, the machine will "waste its time in totally 
pointless variations". 
Thus, for an improved "type B-strategy", as he calls it, Shannon 
proposes, first, to make the stop rule dependent on a function of the 
position, g(P), that decides whether or not it is sufficiently "quiescent", 
"relatively stable" or "dead" to warrant a static evaluation; second, to 
select among the legal possibilities a subset of variations that are worth 
examining. The decision whether or not to examine a particular next 
move (continuation) in a variation should depend on a function of the 
position and of the (type of) move, h(P, M), a function that assumes 
large values for capturing, checking, threatening and developing moves, 
medium values for defensive moves and low values for other, non-
functional moves. Shannon believes "that an electronic computer in-
corporating these two improvements in the program would play a fairly 
strong game". 
3. After Shannon's pioneering exposition of the problems a number 
of chess playing programs have been actually developed. Most of Shannon's 
ideas have been realized in some form or other. In addition, alternative 
strategies and various refinements have been worked and tried out. 
Newell, Shaw and Simon, in their 1958 article, have summarized what 
has been done in the field of chess programming up to that time, including 
their own work, of which they give a quite comprehensive exposition-
as publications on programming activities go (NEWELL, SHAW and SIMON 
1958). 
It is of course impossible to go into details now. I would only like to 
consider briefly a few of the main heuristics that have been applied or 
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proposed to solve what is evidently the crucial problem, namely: How 
to cut down the branchings, not only in depth but also and primarily in 
breadth? 
In spite of the high calculating power of the machine (as compared 
to a human player) it is essential to borrow some of the latter's enormous 
skill (as compared to a machine) in selecting from the large number of 
legally possible moves or continuations only a very few that are really 
worth considering. 
Almost all the attempts at solving this problem involve specification 
of the board goals the player should try to attain. The principle is quite 
simple: if one knows exactly what he is after, the originally boundless 
range of possibilities shrinks to a few lines of action. Also, the more 
specific the goal, the easier it is to reject what is not conducive to its 
attainment. That is, not only does Shannon's move selection function 
h(P, M) become more selective; the cutting power of the stop rule, g(P), 
is enhanced as well. 
4. The various procedures that have been proposed can be roughly 
divided into three types: single, simultaneous multiple and successive 
goal specification. 
Single goal specification procedures are meant to single out specific 
types of positions in which only one board goal is really relevant from 
which the few moves that are worth considering can be derived. A good 
example is the strategic program developed by Dr. Max Euwe within the 
Euratom group. It aims at spotting thematic positions- as would be 
found in a textbook on chess strategy- and programming their cor-
responding thematic treatment. If a given position has a number of 
specific characteristics- among which the absence of promising or danger-
ous tactical complications, a criterion that is supposedly checked in 
advance- a corresponding set of considerable moves is generated and 
examined in a given order of priority; e.g. the typical manoeuvers (move 
sequences) of a minority attack with the Pawns on the Queen's wing. 
(Chess players will know what I mean.) 
Simultaneous multiple goal specification is typically used in the chess 
program of the Carnegie-Rand group. A number of standard subgoals 
of particular importance in the opening and early middle game phase, 
such as center control, material balance, king safety, are used for genera-
ting, selecting and determining priorities of moves and continuations to 
be analyzed as well as for evaluating outcomes. The different subgoals 
have different priorities according to the position, so that the program 
at a certain point may primarily "play on center control". There is no 
additive and therefore simply compensatory evaluation function: for 
each subgoal separately, the program checks the degree to which the 
position has improved, remained as it was or deteriorated. I.e., the out-
come remains a vector to be compared with a pre-set goal vector where 
26 Series A 
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the subgoal values are derived from the situation in the previous position 
in the game. Also, the decision procedure is no longer of a pure minimax 
type, since under certain conditions the first move -in the priority order 
-which meets the goal vector requirements may be chosen. 
Successive goal specification is one of the underlying principles of the 
Euratom group effort. The idea was to have the program actually 
"analyse" the position by means of a series of filters, that is, questions 
specifying certain tentative board goals such as: Can I mate him force-
fully by a series of checks? Can he mate me- after "no move" on my 
part? Can I gain material? Can he gain material? And, in case there are 
no substantial tactical hopes or dangers: Can I play some specific strategic 
goal (Euwe's strategic program)? 
The advantages of this successive procedure are twofold. First, each 
question being specific the goal can be well defined and its attainment 
easily checked. Second, as answers from subprograms come in, the position 
step by step classifies itself, that is, the question which board goals the 
program should try to attain can be more and more precisely answered. 
An apparent disadvantage from a point of view of programming efficiency 
is that the same move, say, the capture of a Bishop with check, may 
have to be analysed a number of times; for instance, first to see whether, 
by that move, forced mate, then whether material gain and finally whether 
some positional advantage is attainable. 
5. The economizing effect of specifying a goal can be nicely illustrated 
if the quantitative part of goal specifications is singled out for a somewhat 
closer inspection. 
A program with quantitative goal specification selects and evaluates on 
the basis of a scalar evaluation function, on the one hand, and a pre-set, 
though, ideally, variable level of expectation on the other. The advantages 
are threefold: 
( l) Continuations or moves with a derived outcome value below the 
"expectancy" can be immediately rejected, that is, comparisons with 
outcomes of other variations, as a complete minimax procedure would 
require, are superfluous now. · 
(2) If for a move or continuation- aimed at attaining the expectancy 
-one answer can be shown to exist that "refutes" the move, i.e., one 
answer with a derived outcome below the expectancy, other answers 
need not be examined any more. The economizing power of this procedure 
can be very high, in particular if an adequate set of priority rules 
maximizes the likelihood that refuting answers are hit upon early in the 
process. 
(3) Move and continuation selection can become much more economical 
since, in order to be worth considering, continuations must have a 
sufficient offensive value to bridge the gap between the value of a given 
analysis-produced position and the expectation. This involves an extension 
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of the stop rule and of the concept of "end position": the program stops 
and starts working backward in every analysis position that is either 
"dead" or "exhausted". By definition, a position is "exhausted", if (1) 
it is not "dead", according to whatever position function is used, while 
(2) no continuations are available of a sufficient offensive value to justify 
any hope of attaining the expectancy. It will be clear that this is, again, 
a cutting device based on the introduction of an expectation level. 
The figures and text in the appendices, taken from the (uncompleted) 
"heuristic material gain program" (GMG) that was developed within the 
Euratom group, may serve to illustrate the economizing effect of quan-
titative goal specification. 
First, APPENDIX I provides the main definitions and criteria used 
in GMG. 
APPENDIX II, for the case of attacking moves by a Knight, illustrates 
the principle of the determination of combined threat values. Example: 
If, by a Knight move, an unprotected Bishop (Bu) and a protected 
Rook (Rp) are simultaneously attacked, the "combined threat value" of 
this move equals 20. 
For the diagramed position of APPENDIX III A, the (GMG-)refutation 
of one particular variation is shown in APPENDIX III B. Finally, the 
economizing effect of the quantitative goal specification system of GMG 
can be seen from the table of APPENDIX IV: analysis positions in which 
more than two branchings must be considered are relatively rare. 
6. So far for a brief survey of a few basic ideas and techniques con-
sidered from the programming point of view. The question now to be 
discussed is in how far all this fits the ideas simulation-prone psychologists 
-like the present writer- have about human thinking. Is this really 
simulation of human thought processes? 
In answering this crucial question, we should first take into account 
that only few of the chess programmers cherish the aspiration expressly 
to simulate human thinking and to contribute to our theoretical under-
standing of it- among them primarily the Carnegie-Rand Group. Most 
others just consider chess a challenging and instructive object for non-
numerical programming efforts: they solely aspire to make a machine 
play a good game of chess. 
Even so, they cannot but use fallible heuristics that are evidently 
borrowed from human thinking. For, there is no room for any doubt that 
each of the principles, tricks, gimmicks, or methods we have presently 
mentioned- whether or not they are called "heuristics"- are quite 
regularly applied by the human chessplayer in at least a highly analogous 
form. Let us again list and check them briefly. 
Human chessplayers certainly use approximate static evaluation methods 
to be applied to relatively quiescent, so-called dead positions; they do 
apply minimax-like choice procedures; in selecting moves and continua-
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tions they make use of position and move parameters as in Shannon's or 
anybody else's move selection function. The general idea of goal speci-
fication is a rather obvious one since humans have board goals in mind 
while they play; the method of singling out specific types of positions 
where specific board goals are predominant derives from the vast system 
of position characteristics and the highly differentiated "typology" (or 
intuitive classification) of positions the experienced chessplayer has 
certainly in his memory; the vector-like simultaneous multiple goal speci-
fication heuristics Newell and Simon have employed simulate the chess-
player's multiple goal considerations on which he bases his choice of 
move ; successive goal specification heuristics are explicitly inspired by 
what is known, by experience and by experiment, about the human 
thought process ("Let us first see if anything can be done"; or: " ... if 
there are any immediate threats", or: " ... if I can break through with 
my attack", etc.). While they calculate variations, human players have 
most certainly a quantitative expectation in mind by which they measure 
their outcomes and select continuations to be considered; consequently, 
they do use the heuristic of immediate rejection as a shortcut to minimax; 
they also operate with priority rules that accelerate the elimination of 
what is not up to their expectations. All these heuristics are known by 
experience; moreover, they have been found, without exception, in my 
own experimental investigations of the chessplayer's thought process 
(DE GROOT, 1946, 1964). 
7. But, does this answer the question whether a program based on 
such borrowed principles and methods really simulates a human thought 
process? 
We are obviously in need of criteria if we want a decisive answer. It 
would seem that two general criteria are of crucial importance for a 
satisfactory machine simulation of a human cognitive process: 
( l) The achievement criterion: the program should perform on a level 
with the skilled human subjects it presumes to simulate; in chess, it 
should ideally play a game on master level. 
(2) The process criterion: the general structure and methodology of 
the machine process, as evidenced by its "protocol", should closely 
resemble the general structure of the human process. 
Application of the first criterion leads to a disappointing result: pro-
grams thus far are still very poor chessplayers. What is more, from my 
own experience -limited as it may be- I do not have much hope of any 
substantial improvement in the near future. But, I had better abstain 
from prophecies. The facts are, at present, that with regard to chess 
programming the criterion of master level achievement is not met. 
One could argue, however, that the second criterion is more important: 
"Let the machine be a weak player if only it thinks like a weak human 
player". Do chess machine protocols stand the test of the process criterion 1 
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In some respects they certainly do. This is true, in particular, with 
regard to some of the machine protocols of the Carnegie-Rand group I 
had occasion to look at. However, I shall not specify now what I feel is 
satisfactory and promising but rather finish this exposition by pointing 
to one specific defect in the resemblance between machine-produced and 
human protocols; a defect that is, in my opinion, of crucial importance 
and highly challenging for future research. 
8. Psychological analysis of thinking-aloud protocols (DE GROOT, 
1946) has shown two things. 
First, difference in playing strength, e.g. between grandmasters and 
expert players, depends much less on calculating power than on skill in 
"problem conception", i.e. being able immediately to see and for quickly 
to develop during the thought process a highly specific and objectively 
adequate idea of, let us say, "what the board problems really are". 
Second, every thinking aloud protocol, regardless of class, evidences 
an intensive development of the subject's problem conception during the 
thought process. There is a first Phase of "problem formation", there 
are many transitional phases of "problem transformation"- between 
elaborations of particular solving propositions. Thought processes of a 
somewhat longer duration- say, ten minutes or more- as evoked by 
difficult choice problems, generally can be divided into some four parts 
where different search sub-goals appear to govern the process; roughly: 
orientation in the position;· exploration of possibilities; goal-directed 
investigation; striving for proof that the intended choice is the right one. 
Obviously, such changing search goals are related to changes in the 
subject's problem conception, that are not explicitly taken into account 
in current chess programs. 
In general, the idea of a developing problem conception has not received 
much attention from the people who work at the machine side. In the 
human process, on the other hand; the subject's changing problem con-
ception appears to play a leading role. Huinan protocols abound with 
statements on board problems, board goals, specific anticipations-
hypotheses to be tested, ideas to be tried out- all of which appear to 
derive from the subject's present conception of the choice problem as a 
whole in this particular phase of the process. 
One could, of course, doubt the relevance of such, largely introspective, 
data for the application of the process criterion. But, the continuous 
problem development in the human process has also some highly interesting 
consequences for the structure of the process that cannot be disregarded. 
I refer to what I have called the phenomenon of progressive deepening. 
The phase-wise development of the subject's problem conception is 
expressed in a progressive deepening of the move examinations ( calcula-
tions) he enters upon. Structurally, the crucial point is that, under a 
changed problem conception, it may be quite sensible and efficient to 
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re-inveBtigate the Bame move anew, this time deeper and maybe with a 
different board goal, a different quantitative expectation- brief, with a 
different idea in mind. 
In fact, such re-investigations occur quite often. One example is shown 
in APPENDIX V. In the formulae each letter symbolizes a reported 
examination of a particular move. The characterization: of Phases, as 
indicated under the formulae, can not be derived from the formula data 
alone; they are based on an interpretation of the protocol as a whole. 
Even without any interpretation, however, the formulae themselves show 
clearly that the same move is often taken up more than once for a re-
investigation of its consequences. Evidently, this would not make sense 
if it were not done for different reasons on each occasion. The move is 
the same but the problem conception must have changed in some respect; 
another search goal, another board goal, another expectation. 
9. It will be clear that the idea of a developing problem conception 
that governs the process is related to what has been said about the 
heuristics of goal specification, in particular successive specification. But, 
these machine heuristics are still extremely primitive compared to the 
specificity and flexibility of the continuous problem development in the 
human thinker. No program thus far, whether for chess playing or for 
other problems of rational choice, produces anything like progressive 
deepening as we find it in the human process. In my opinion, this particular 
problem is crucial to future attempts to simulate human thought processes 
in order to develop good, concise and testable theories on thinking- and, 
possibly, to develop stronger playing programs as well. 
10. Why is it that important, from a theoretical point of view? 
One part of the answer is that progressive deepening in its most general 
form is such a frequently employed human heuristic, such a ubiquitous 
human method of approaching a complex problem that its absence in 
heuristic programming and machine simulation of cognitive processes is 
in itself a serious shortcoming. In traditional problem solving, but in 
particular in scientific research, in creative activities, it is a general 
strategy: first to orient ourselves in the problem situation, then to explore 
some possibilities, next to inveBtigate more thoroughly a few ideas or 
hypotheses we have set our hopes on and, finally, to try to prove that 
our preferred solution is right. In this process, the chances are high that 
the same solving proposition is taken up more than once: one may even 
for some time shuttle between two alternative ideas. This is by no means 
necessarily a result of undecisiveness or forgetfulness; it may reflect a 
sound and quite efficient problem development. 
The other part of the answer- why it is that important- I would like 
to introduce by referring to a cartoon that was published a few years 
ago in "The New Yorker". It shows a very womanly lady to whom an 
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electronic computer obviously has been shown and explained. Her com-
ment: "Sure it can think- but can it change its mind?" 
Curiously, the lady hits the computer at a very weak spot, indeed. For, 
good thinking does imply "changing your mind" -not capriciously as 
ladies are supposed to do but quite rationally, by problem and goal 
transformations on the basis of incoming information. This is, in fact, 
what the chessplayer does; or, in general, the human problem solver, 
creative artist or researcher. The good human problem solver employs 
a highly sensitive goal feedback mechanism. In chess, for instance, the 
incoming information is by no means restricted to quantitative outcomes 
of variations. The player may get the "feeling that" he is not on the 
right track long before his search routine is completed, he may "hit upon" 
a new solving proposition via something analogous that produced itself 
during the investigation of another move; he may just "take another 
look" at the position itself or, mentally, at some envisaged position in 
a variation and see something new there. Briefly, in between elaborative 
operations, in "transitional phases", he perceives and abstracts information 
of a qualitative nature that enables him to readjust his problem conception 
and to reassess his board goals-that is, to "change his mind". 
It would be unjust to say that there is no goal feedback in current chess 
playing programs, but it is certainly still quite primitive. This results 
from the fact that the machine is extremely weak in the unsystematic 
means-finding operations of a perceptive and abstractive nature that are so 
well developed in the skilled human problem solver, in the chessmaster 
within his visual medium in particular. 
ll. Personally, I do not believe that the machine's handicap in the 
perceptive and abstractive sphere can be easily overcome or compensated 
for. It will be hard to meet even a highly conservative achievement 
criterion. Even so, it is worth while to continue trying, in chess playing 
programs as well as in other, less visual tasks with less arbitrarily complex 
rules. 
12. Final question: Why is it worth the effort? Generally: Why is 
simulation of thinking worthwhile? 
First, even before any actual machine program is constructed the 
endeavor to reformulate a complex, verbal theory in the general terms of a 
program exposes better than any other procedure where it is vague or 
inconsistent or incomplete: it provides a realistic insight into its explaining 
power and the limitations thereof. Second, apart from comprehensive 
theories on complex cognitive processes, more specific hypotheses can be 
tested by means of programming. This has been done, for instance, by 
Simon and Simon, with regard to the question whether solving difficult 
problems-finding an involved mating combination-can be explained, 
in principle, by relatively simple but powerfully selective heuristics. 
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Another example would be to demonstrate by actual programming the 
selective power of a solely q~antitative goal specification (our example). 
Among other things, such a demonstration would be of importance for 
theories on the cognitive function of setting a "level of aspiration" and, 
in general, of hypothesis formation. Final example: Showing that, and 
investigating how, an efficient goal feedback program can be developed 
that produces a process with progressive deepening might be of crucial 
importance for the development of general theories of complex cognitive 
processes- perceptual processes included. 
Generally, the use of computer principles, techniques and trying out 
facilities may greatly enhance the fertility of our research efforts in the 
cognitive field. I would like to add one proviso without comment: provided 
this particular use of the computer is adequately combined with cor-
responding laboratory experimentation. 
University of Amsterdam 
APPENDIX I 
Sub-program GMG: Material Gain Possible? 
Definitions and Criteria : 
(1) The values of pieces are determined as follows: 
v(Pawn)=lO; v(Bishop)=v(Knight)=30; v(Rook)=45; v(Queen)=85. 
(2) The P-value, Vp, of an analyaia position (P=P(layer), or machine) is the 
material surplus for P; supposing that the given position is materially equal, 
Vp=O. 
(3) The material gain question implies that a level of minimal expectation for P 
is set: Ep=5 (e.g., P has Bishop and Knight against Rook and Pawn). 
(4) Correspondingly, there is a level of maximal expectation for P's Adversary: 
Ea=O. 
(5) Whenever the P-value· of an analysis position, Vp, is below Ep (with P to 
play), it is solely by offensive moves (captures, checks, threats) that P may 
hope to bridge the gap, i.e. to gain material. Therefore, only P-moves with 
a sufficient offensive value are worth examining (see 8). 
(6) Correspondingly, whenever the P-value of an analysis position, Vp, is above 
Ea (with A to play), only A-moves with a sufficient offensive value are worth 
considering. 
(7) The selection criteria for moves and continuations are, therefore: 
off. value (P-move) ~ Ep-Vp 
off. value (A-move) ~ Vp-Ea 
If a materially equal position is given, the criterion for P-move eligibility 
under GMG is: off. value (P-move) ~ 5 
(8) The offensive value of a move=its capture value+its check value+its threat 
t:alue, where: 
capture value=value of piece taken, 
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check value=in principle, a position-dependent parameter; in "normal", 
non-exceptional positions it is a constant ( = 10}, 
threat value=value of the two strongest capturing threats resulting from 
the move, combined according to table (see the example for knight moves, 
App. II). 
(9) Stop rule : The analysis stops whenever the Position is Exhausted (PE), i.e. 
whenever no more sufficiently offenaive continuations are available. This then 
amounts to a refutation of the previous move that is now replaced by the 
next one, according to the priority order. Etc. 
(10) Move or continuation prioritillB within the group of sufficiently offensive moves 
are, again, primarily determined by their offensive values. 
APPENDIX II 
Table of combined threat valull8 if a Knight doll8 the attacking move. 
(P=Pawn, B=Bishop or Knight, R=Rook, Q=Queen; the second letter u=un-
protected, p=protected by at least one defender). 
attack 
of Pu Bu Rp Ru I Qp Qu 
and: - 5 15 10 20 I 30 40 
Pu 5 15 10 20 30 40 
Bu 15 20 20 25 35 45 
Rp 10 20 20 25 35 45 
Ru 20 25 25 30 40 45 
Qp 30 35 35 40 (50) (50) 
Qu 40 45 45 45 (50) (50) 
N.B. The offensive value of a Knight move by which a protected Pawn or a 
protected Bishop or Knight is attacked is zero. 
APPENDIX IliA 
Example position (after 8 ... B-N5) 
Diagram of an arbitrarily chosen position for which the GMG-refutation of one 
variation is worked out in Appendix IIIB. 
10. QxB, 
45, +10 
45, +10 
45, +10 
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APPENDIX IIIB 
Hand-simulated refutation of the variation (see diagram IliA): 9. PxP, BxN?; by 
10. QxB. 
The figures underneath each move are its offensive value and the resulting Vp-
value, respectively. 
NxP/Q5; II. QxN, P-KB4; 12. QxBch., QxQ; 13. PE-
40, 0 45, +30 30, +30 40, +60 85,-25 
12. QxN, PE+ 
35, +60 I 
t PE+ < 
N-Q7; II. PxN, NxQch.; 12. PE-
35, +10 35, +40 95,-45 
II. BxN, NxP; 12. QxPch, KxQ; 13. PE-
30, +40 40, +30 25, +40 85,---45 
12. B-B3, NxQch; 13. PE-
15, +30 95,-55 
12. B-K3, NxQch; 13. PE-
15, +30 95,-55 
12. Q-K3, N-B7; 13. BxN, PE+ 
15, +30 40, +30 30, +60 
N-B4; 13. BxN, PE+ 
30, +30 30, +60 I ~ PE+ PE + < 
N-K4; II. QxN, PE+ 
30, +10 45, +40 
N-N4; 11. PxN, NxQch.; 12. PE-
30, +10 35, +40 95,---45 
II. BxN, NxP; 12. BxB, NxQch.; 13. PxN, QxB; 14. P-Q6, QxP; 
30, +40 40, +30 60, +60 95,-25 30, +5 30,-25 30, -25 25, -35 
PE- PE-
12. QxPch, KxQ; 13. PE-
40, +30 20, +40 85,---45 
12. B-B6, NxQch; 13. PE-
15, +30 95,-55 
12. Q-B6, BxQ; 13. PE-
15, +30 100,-55 
12. B-K3, NxQch; 13. PE-
15, +30 95,-55 
12. Q-K3, N-B7; 13. BxB, NxQ; 14. BxQ, PE+ 
15, +30 40, +30 60, +60 95,-25 90, +60 
PE+ ( 
N-B4; 13. BxB, NxQ; 14. BxQ, PE+ 
15, +30 30, +30 60, +60 95, -25 90, +60 
PE+ PE+ PE+ ( 
QxP; II. BxN, NxP; 12. BxQ, PE+ 
45, +10 15, 0 70, +30 40, +20 90, +105 
N-K4; 12. BxQ, PE+ 
30, +30 90, +115 
QxB; 12. QxQ, PE+ 
30,0 85, +85 
QxPfR7; 12. RxQ, PE+ 
30, +20 85, + 1o5 1 
-- PE + ~----- PE + ~<-------' L~ RESULT: After 9. PxP, the answer 9 ... BxN has been refuted. 
15. Pll 
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APPENDIX IV 
Distribution of number of branches examined in each analysis position, grouped by 
move number; according to the GMG-analysis of the variation: 9. PxP, BxN; 
IO. QxB (App. IIIB) in the example position (App. IliA). 
I 
IO II 
I 
II 
I 
I2 
I 
I2 I3 I3 I4 ! 14 
I 
15 II Total (B) (W) (B) (W) (B) (W) (B) (W) I (B) (W) 
0 - - 1 2 5 8 2 - 2 1 21 
I - 3 5 5 9 5 3 3 1 - 34 
2 - 2 - 1 2 - - - - - 5 
3 - - - - - - - - - - 0 
4 - - I 1 - - - - - - 2 
5 I - - 1 - - - - - - 2 I 
N.B. The zero-total, 21, indicates the total number of evaluated end positions. 
Analysis positions in which more than two branchings must be considered appear 
to the relatively rare. 
APPENDIX V ( cf. DE GROOT I964, Section 42, p. 170) 
Formula of successive solving propositions from the protocol (G6; 0), i.e. Dr. S. G. 
Tartakowe<'s treatment of position C: "a rather extreme example" of repeated 
re·investigations (and prog<essive deepening) 
2 3 4 5 
d-a-e-c- -c-e-c-e- -d-d-e-e-e- -d-d-e-Q. 
I 2 3 
orientation exploration investigation proof 
Each letter symbolizes a move. Move e is taken up five times, move d three times 
- - and finally played. 
REFERENCES 
BERNSTEIN, A. and M. DE V. RoBERTS, Computer vs chess player. Scientific American, 
198, p. 96-105, I958. 
----, T. ARBUCKLE and M. A. BELSKY, A chess playing program 
for the IBM 704. Proceedings of the I958 Western Joint Computer 
Conference, p. I57-I59, May I958. 
Euratom C.E.T.I.S., Computer en schaakspel. Amsterdam: Stichting Studiecentrum 
voor Administratieve Automatisering, I963. 
GRooT, A. D. DE, Het denken van den schaker. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche 
Uitg. Mij., I946. 
----, Thought and choice in chess. Den Haag: Mouton, to be published in I964. 
~EWELL, A., The chess machine. In: Ware, W. H. (chairman) Session on learning 
machines. Proceedings of the I955 Western Joint Computer Conference, 
p. 85-Ill, March I955. 
----, J. C. SHAW and H. A. SIMON, Chess·playing programs and the problem 
of complexity. The RAND corporation paper, Sept. I958, P-I3I9. 
and H. A. SIMON, Computer simulation of human thinking. The RAND 
corporation paper, April I96I, P-2276. 
398 
SAMUEL, C. E., Programming a computer to play games. In: Alt, F. (ed.) Advances 
in computers. New York: Academic Press, 1960. 
SHANNON, C. E., Programming a digital computer for playing chess. Phil. Mag., 
41, p. 356--375, March 1950. 
SIMON, H. A. and P. A. SIMON, Trial and error search in solving difficult problems: 
Evidence from the game of chess. Behavioral Science, 7, p. 425-429, 1962. 
TURING, A.M., Digital computers applied to games. In: Bowden, B. V. (ed.) Faster 
than thought. London: Pitman, p. 286-310, 1953. 
